The future of US facilities in northern Australia
By Susan Thomson | ASPI The Strategist |8 July 2025 | Frontline Veterans News
A USAF B-1B Lancer landing at RAAF Amberley: Jesse Kane/Department of Defence.
As the Indo-Pacific becomes the defining theatre of 21st-century strategic competition, northern Australia has emerged as a crucial area for US force projection and deterrence.
But while their presence offers undeniable strategic value, it also raises serious questions about infrastructure strain, sovereignty and Australia’s long-term role in US defence planning, particularly under the Trump administration.
If the US presence is to serve Australia’s national interests, we must lead a transparent, whole-of-government conversation about purpose, risks, and the public investments required to support this presence.
The bases and facilities hosting US forces include: RAAF bases Learmonth, Curtin, Tindal, Scherger, and Townsville; the US Marines training facilities in Darwin; the communications facility North West Cape; and, most famously, Pine Gap. Darwin hosts up to 2,500 US Marines every dry season for training purposes. AUKUS has created the legitimate possibility of another joint facility, potentially a submarine maintenance facility, presenting a significant advantage for US submarine capability.
Strategically positioned, these bases and facilities are located either for their proximity to the Indo-Pacific, enabling rapid access and regional engagement, or because their remoteness presents significant challenges for potential adversaries. In some cases, their climate also offers unique advantages for military training, scientific research and capability development.
There has been long-standing and legitimate public concern in Australia about the national security and sovereignty risks posed by the presence of US bases and facilities on our soil.
Not since the influential work of Desmond Ball in the 1980s and 1990s has there been a sustained national conversation on the strategic consequences of hosting US defence infrastructure. Ball’s core question—whether the risks of retaliation from US adversaries are adequately offset by US willingness to defend these sites—sparked an essential public debate on whether such facilities ultimately safeguard or endanger Australia.
That conversation, once central, has faded. It is now time to renew it—not to end or restrict the alliance, but to ensure there is continued public understanding, scrutiny and support for Australia’s evolving strategic posture and the role these facilities play in it.
The decision to allow US deployments and the presence of joint facilities on Australian soil remains an independent one. These arrangements are governed by Australian law, subject to government oversight, and reflect choices made in pursuit of our national interest.
Hosting allied forces does not diminish sovereignty; it exercises it. Australia retains the authority to set the terms, conditions and limits of these partnerships, including how and when bases are used.
The real challenge lies not in maintaining sovereignty, but in ensuring that decisions are made transparently, with public understanding and consent, and in alignment with long-term national priorities.
The second challenge is ensuring that this understanding is communicated clearly to the public and not hijacked by misinformation, conspiracy theories or polarised political narratives.
The broader conversation on the nature of the United States’ defence posture in Australia warrants continued and thorough debate. The nature of what happens at, passes through, and can be actioned from the bases and facilities has burst into public debate in light of the US’s involvement in the Israel-Iran war. Given the Trump administration’s fast and loose interpretation of law and rules-based order, there is reason to be concerned about the effects on Australia’s sovereignty.
Meanwhile, the feasibility and practicality of hosting US forces in Australia should be more closely interrogated. The growing US military presence in northern Australia brings both economic opportunities and strategic alignment, but also significant infrastructure liabilities.
While joint training and rotational deployments inject capital into the local economy, they also place considerable strain on public systems that are already under pressure. Darwin’s sewage system is at capacity, the electricity grid is increasingly stressed, and water shortages remain a persistent—and likely worsening—challenge.
Seasonal flooding regularly disrupts the Northern Territory’s road networks, degrading conditions for civilian use and leaving them highly vulnerable to damage from military logistics and heavy equipment. Large-scale exercises such as Pitch Black expose these vulnerabilities, revealing the fragility of the current infrastructure.
If the expansion of US and Australian defence activities in the north is a serious response to China’s regional ambitions, it must be matched by an equally serious and coordinated commitment to upgrading the civilian infrastructure that underpins it. Transparency across local, state and territory, and federal governments on both the benefits and burdens of this presence is essential to long-term sustainability, community trust and operational resilience.
Australian governments at all levels should openly discuss the presence of US bases and facilities, what they want out of these facilities, and how they plan to mitigate the drawbacks.